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ONE OF ONE: JUSTICE GANTS AND 
LESSONS FROM THE KEO CASE 
JOSHUA E. GOLDSTEIN* 
Abstract: Chief Justice Ralph D. Gants was a uniquely kind and empathetic per-
son and an enormously consequential reformer. He was also a model judge. He 
prepared for each case like it was the only one before him, considered thorny le-
gal issues from every angle, and pursued justice in all his judicial work. These 
qualities were on full display in Commonwealth v. Keo. There, a dissenting Jus-
tice Gants identified a question of fundamental fairness, one which the parties 
had not raised: If a prosecutor, based on essentially the same evidence, makes 
contradictory statements in the trials of two different defendants, can a defendant 
introduce those statements into evidence as admissions of a party opponent? In 
his dissent, Justice Gants answered that question brilliantly, disentangling a com-
plex legal issue to craft a solution that was both pragmatic and would make the 
legal system operate more fairly. Though not among his most famous opinions, 
Justice Gants’s Keo dissent reveals the sharpness and integrity of his legal mind 
and his constant pursuit of a more just, fair, and righteous legal system. 
INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice Ralph D. Gants was one of one. The most knowledgeable 
yet most humble person in the room. A brilliant legal thinker and theorist who 
never lost sight of the practical, real-world consequences of his work. A genius 
who, through his disarming sense of humor and endless supply of kindness and 
self-deprecating humor, made others feel smarter, more important—better in 
his presence. An impossibly busy person who never cut corners. Someone who 
treated every case on the docket, and every issue he encountered, like it was 
the only one before him. 
I clerked for Chief Justice Gants1 during the 2013–2014 term. A lot hap-
pened that year at the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) and in 
Chief Justice Gants’s chambers in particular. The court handed down a number 
                                                                                                                           
© 2021, Joshua E. Goldstein. All rights reserved. 
* Law Clerk to Chief Justice Ralph D. Gants (2013–2014); Associate, Ropes & Gray LLP (2014–
2021). 
1 I was a law clerk to Chief Justice Gants when he was elevated from Associate Justice to Chief 
Justice on July 28, 2014. I refer to “Chief Justice Gants” as such when discussing his work that 
spanned the year I worked for him, and as “Justice Gants” when discussing work that only took place 
prior to his confirmation as Chief Justice. 
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of momentous decisions on everything from the legality of Massachusetts’s 
community parole supervision for life statutory scheme as a punishment for 
sex offenders,2 whether sentencing a juvenile to life without parole was a cruel 
or unusual punishment under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,3 and how 
to handle the fallout from the Annie Dookhan evidence tampering scandal.4, 5 
Justice Gants’s role on the court changed during that time. After Chief 
Justice Roderick Ireland announced his retirement, Governor Deval Patrick 
selected then-Associate Justice Gants to replace him.6 In the following months, 
Justice Gants appeared before and was confirmed unanimously by the Gover-
nor’s Council and sworn in as Chief Justice.7 
Beyond the courtroom, Justice Gants was constantly working on the 
many initiatives and reforms, particularly around access to justice, that came to 
define his legacy. I marveled at his drive. Even before becoming Chief Justice, 
he seemed to be working the equivalent of three or four full-time jobs, all on 
issues of critical importance to the Commonwealth and its legal system. 
But when I reflect back on Chief Justice Gants’s legacy and the life-
changing year I spent learning from him up close, the first thing that comes to 
mind is his work on Commonwealth v. Keo,8 and what it says about him as a 
judge and as a person. 
I. COMMONWEALTH V. KEO 
Keo was not a highly anticipated case. It did not receive much, if any, 
media attention, and on the surface, it did not involve any of the novel or 
weighty legal issues that typically occupy the SJC.9 And the SJC’s decision 
                                                                                                                           
2 See Commonwealth v. Cole, 10 N.E.3d 1081, 1082 (Mass. 2014) (Gants, J.) (majority opinion). 
3 See Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 286–87 (Mass. 2013). 
4 See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 5 N.E.3d 519, 520–21 (Mass. 2014); Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 5 N.E.3d 530, 535–36 (Mass. 2014); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 5 N.E.3d 552, 554, 556–57 
(Mass. 2014). 
 5 Annie Dookhan, a chemist working in the Massachusetts’ state drug lab, engaged in misconduct 
that called into question the validity of thousands of chemical analyses, resulting in the dismissal of 
more than twenty thousand drug cases. See Katie Mettler, How a Lab Chemist Went from ‘Superwoman’ 




6 Bob Salsberg, Ralph Gants Approved as SJC’s Chief Justice, WBUR, https://www.wbur.org/
news/2014/06/11/ralph-gants-sjc-approved [https://perma.cc/PZ4Q-DG22] (June 11, 2014). 
7 Id.; Gants Sworn in as New Chief Justice of SJC, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 28, 2014), https://
apnews.com/article/dbf581596d7d4b79a8abaf3a54cc8690 [https://perma.cc/NX97-7JGP]. 
8 3 N.E.3d 55 (Mass. 2014). 
9 See, e.g., MASS. R. APP. P. 11(a) (providing that the Supreme Judicial Court may grant applica-
tion for direct appellate review if case presents “(1) questions of first impression or novel questions of 
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ultimately affirmed the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction.10 But Keo 
offers a glimpse of Justice Gants at his finest. 
Keo involved a fatal shooting where the defendant, Kevin Keo, and sev-
eral fellow gang members, including Bonrad Sok, were present.11 The victim 
was a member of a rival gang.12 It was unclear whether Keo, Sok, or another 
member of their gang pulled the trigger.13 
At Keo’s trial, the prosecutor argued that Keo, not Sok, was the shooter, 
and regardless, that Keo was guilty as a joint venturer.14 Keo argued that Sok 
was the shooter and that Keo was not guilty as a joint venturer because he did 
not share Sok’s state of mind in killing the victim.15 The jury disagreed, conclud-
ing that Keo was guilty of murder in the first degree, either because Keo was the 
shooter or he aided or abetted the shooter and shared the shooter’s intent for 
murder.16 Keo’s appeal went straight to the SJC pursuant to Massachusetts law, 
which entitles defendants convicted of murder in the first degree to appeal 
their convictions to the SJC directly.17 
Keo came to the SJC for argument during the September 2013 sitting, a 
four-day period in which the court typically heard twenty or more cases. To 
prepare for oral argument, Justice Gants and his colleagues had to read and 
digest an average of three briefs per case (appellant, appellee, and reply briefs), 
plus any materials from the record, caselaw, statutes, regulations, or other mate-
rials necessary to understand the issues involved in the case. Justice Gants had 
noticed that, according to the appellant’s brief, Sok was tried for the murder 
months before Keo’s trial, and at Sok’s trial, the prosecutor had argued that 
Sok, not Keo, was the shooter.18 The jury eventually convicted Sok of murder 
in the second degree as a joint venturer.19 
Keo’s trial counsel did not seek to admit the prosecutor’s contradictory 
statements at the Sok trial into evidence, and Keo’s appellate counsel did not 
raise the issue on appeal. Nevertheless, it caught Justice Gants’s attention. The 
                                                                                                                           
law . . . or (3) questions of such public interest that justice requires a final determination by the full 
Supreme Judicial Court”). 
10 Keo, 3 N.E.3d at 66. 
11 Id. at 58–61. 
12 Id. at 58. 
13 Id. at 59–62. 
14 Id. at 57–58. 
15 Id. at 61–63. 
16 Id. at 57–58, 63–65. Under Commonwealth v. Zanetti, the jury was not required to decide 
whether Keo was the shooter, or whether he aided or abetted the shooter and shared his intent for the 
murder, in order to convict Keo of murder in the first degree. 910 N.E.2d 869, 871, 885–86 (Mass. 
2009) (Gants, J.) (majority opinion); see also Keo, 3 N.E.3d at 57–58, 63–64. 
 17 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (2021). 
18 Defendant/Appellant’s Brief on Appeal from Judgments of the Superior Court at 18–19, Keo, 3 
N.E.3d 55 (Mass. 2014) (SJC-10949), 2013 WL 4251799. 
19 Keo, 3 N.E.3d at 57–58, 58 n.2. 
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notion that a prosecutor could present contradictory arguments to juries in dif-
ferent trials and the defendant in the second trial might be precluded from in-
forming the jury about the contradiction seemed problematic, and Justice 
Gants wanted to learn more. 
He started with the record, arranging for the transcript from the Sok trial 
to be delivered to chambers, along with the Keo trial transcript, to get a fuller 
picture of what had transpired. 
Next, he wanted to know what other courts had said about the issue. It 
turned out the SJC had addressed it decades earlier. In Commonwealth v. Arse-
nault, the court considered whether a prosecutor’s statements at one trial were 
admissible in a subsequent retrial of one of the defendants where the govern-
ment’s theory of the case had changed.20 At the first trial, Henry Arsenault, Jr., 
was tried alongside two joint venturers, one of whom, the prosecutor argued 
during opening and closing argument, had planned a robbery in which Arse-
nault allegedly participated.21 Fifteen years later, Arsenault was tried again.22 
At that trial, he was the only defendant, and that time, the prosecutor asserted 
Arsenault had planned the robbery.23 The court held the prosecutor’s contradic-
tory statements from the first trial were not admissible because “the trial of a 
case on one theory does not, without more, constitute an admission by a party 
who proceeds on a different theory in a retrial of the case.”24 The court did not 
explain why not. Instead, it emphasized that the Commonwealth was not 
“lock[ed] . . . into the theory of its first trial” and could “conduct[] the second 
trial on the basis of evidence then available to it” and “proceed[] on any theory 
supported by that evidence.”25 
Other courts had taken a different approach, emphasizing that because the 
government is a party-opponent of the defendant, and because prosecutors act 
as agents of the government, a prosecutor’s prior assertions that are factually 
inconsistent with the theory being presented at a later trial are admissible, so 
long as the prosecutor cannot offer an “‘innocent’ explanation” for the contra-
diction.26 
                                                                                                                           
20 280 N.E.2d 129, 136–37 (1972), overruled by Keo, 3 N.E.3d 55 (Mass. 2014). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 130–32. 
23 Id. at 136–37. 
24 Id. at 136. 
25 Id. 
26 United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 716 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Harris v. United States, 834 
A.2d 106, 120 (D.C. 2003); United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811–12 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992); 
United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 130 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 33 
(2d Cir. 1984); Hoover v. State, 552 So.2d 834, 838, 840 (Miss. 1989); State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 
579 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Wis. 1998). 
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Justice Gants studied these materials and cases in preparation for oral ar-
gument. 
II. ORAL ARGUMENT 
At oral argument, Justice Gants made his concerns known. During the ap-
pellant’s argument, he first confirmed key facts—that Keo’s defense at trial 
had been that Sok was the shooter, and that trial counsel had not sought to ad-
mit the prosecutor’s prior statements to that effect—lest there be some angle or 
explanation he had not considered.27 That was classic Justice Gants. He always 
led with humility, open to the possibility that, despite his immense preparation, 
there might be something he had missed. 
Next, he asked the appellant whether the prosecutor’s statements could 
have been admitted into evidence as admissions by an adverse party, as other 
courts had permitted.28 By raising the issue, particularly one that had not been 
briefed, with the appellant, he not only provided himself and his colleagues the 
benefit of the thoughts of the appellant’s counsel, but also previewed for the 
government the tough questions he would be asking it. Justice Gants did not 
play “gotcha.” Always looking to ensure the process was as fair as possible for 
all, he avoided springing something on a party if he could help it. 
When it was the government’s turn, Justice Gants interrupted counsel to 
ask “a fundamental question” in which he first laid out the prosecutor’s contra-
dictory assertions29 and then asked: “How can a prosecutor make those two 
[conflicting Keo and Sok] arguments in good conscience without the jury un-
derstanding that the same prosecutor at the first trial had argued exactly what 
the defense was arguing, that Sok was indeed the shooter?”30 
His question showed the government—and his fellow Justices—that he 
was already deep into the weeds on an issue of fundamental fairness, which, 
though not briefed, was lurking in the case and would need to be addressed. 
When the government’s counsel attempted to deflect that question and his 
follow-up, Justice Gants returned to first principles: “Does truth not matter? Can 
the same prosecutor make fundamentally different arguments to a jury and not 
be held accountable for that? . . . [I]s that ethical and appropriate for a prosecu-
                                                                                                                           
27 Oral Argument at 5:10–6:11, Commonwealth v. Keo, 3 N.E.3d 55 (Mass. 2014) (SJC-10949), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBtZSG2be5A&t=1232s [https://perma.cc/23CS-YDVA]. 
28 Id. at 6:12–7:03. 
 29 Specifically, Chief Justice Gants said, “How can a prosecutor in your office argue in the Sok 
trial that Sok was the shooter, that Keo’s hand was such that it made him unlikely to be the shooter, 
that the discussion in the back of the car in which the person who admitted to the shooting was Sok, 
and then six months later at the Keo trial say Keo was the shooter, Keo was the person who spoke 
that, and Keo’s hand was not such as to prevent him from being the shooter?” Id. at 21:35–22:09. 
30 Id. at 22:09–22:23. 
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tor’s office to do . . . ?”31 After another unsatisfying response, Justice Gants 
asked the government a question for which there is only one correct answer: 
whether it would like to submit a supplemental brief on the issue.32 The govern-
ment answered in the affirmative and the argument moved on.33 The appellant 
and government both submitted supplemental briefs on the admissibility of the 
prosecutor’s contradictory assertions and what remedy, if any, was appropriate.34 
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The court rejected the defendant’s arguments for a new trial set forth in 
his original brief.35 On the question Justice Gants had identified, whether the 
prosecutor’s prior statements that Sok was the shooter may have been admissi-
ble in the Keo trial, the court split four to three, with the majority answering in 
the negative.36 
The majority concluded that (1) the defendant’s counsel was not ineffec-
tive for failing to seek to admit the prosecutor’s contradictory statements be-
cause Massachusetts courts had not previously said prosecutors’ prior asser-
tions could be admissible as admissions of a party-opponent; and (2) under the 
circumstances, the prosecutor was justified in presenting “alternative (albeit 
inconsistent) theories of liability in each trial”—that is, that Keo was the 
shooter or, in the alternative, was guilty as a joint venturer—“and in so doing 
presented different theories that as a matter of law are not contradictory.”37 The 
majority’s holding was also supported by the fact that both formulations—that 
Sok was the shooter or that Keo was the shooter—were “supported by the evi-
dence,” and “the prosecutor never abandoned his argument that the jury ulti-
mately were not required to determine the identity of the shooter,” and “[t]he 
jury were instructed correctly that the closing arguments of counsel are not 
evidence.”38 
That said, the majority made clear that Arsenault was “no longer sound 
precedent.”39 Further, it left open the possibility that a prosecutor’s contradic-
tory factual assertions could be admissible where no “innocent explanation” 
                                                                                                                           
31 Id. at 24:07–24:44. 
32 Id. at 26:11–26:18. 
33 Id. 
34 Defendant/Appellant’s Supplemental Brief on Appeal from Judgments of the Superior Court, 
Commonwealth v. Keo, 3 N.E.3d 55 (Mass. 2014) (SJC-10949), 2013 WL 8022595; Brief and Sup-
plemental Record Appendix for the Commonwealth, Keo, 3 N.E.3d 55 (SJC-10949), 2013 WL 
4251802. 
35 Keo, 3 N.E.3d at 58–59. 
36 Id. at 63–64, 71–72. 
37 Id. at 68; id. at 67–70. 
38 Id. at 68–69. 
39 Id. at 67 n.21. 
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existed for the contradiction.40 In this case, however, the majority presumed 
that “the jury’s verdict in the Sok trial—that Keo had been the shooter and that 
Sok was liable as a joint venturer”—explained the prosecutor’s shift in theories 
at the Keo trial, and that that explanation was sufficient to warrant exclusion of 
the inconsistent statements.41 Moreover, even if the prosecutor’s contradictory 
statements had been offered and improperly excluded, any error would likely 
not “have unfairly influenced the jury’s verdict”42 because, “pursuant to Com-
monwealth v. Zanetti . . . . the jury could have reached its verdict without de-
termining that the defendant had been the shooter.”43 
IV. JUSTICE GANTS’S DISSENT 
Justice Gants masterfully unraveled these arguments in his dissent. He 
started by setting forth the key facts. As Justice Gants laid bare, the prosecutor 
asserted in the Sok trial that Sok was the shooter,44 and that it could not have 
been Keo, in part because of “the limited mobility” in Keo’s dominant hand.45 
The prosecutor then argued six months later in the Keo trial, based on the same 
core evidence, that Keo was the shooter,46 and that it could not have been Sok 
because he was too far away when the shots were fired.47 Although the prose-
cutor also pursued a joint venture theory in both trials, Justice Gants noted, “a 
joint venture theory was far harder for the prosecution to prove.”48 Although 
“[t]here can be no doubt that the shooter intended with premeditation to kill the 
victim . . . . if Sok was the shooter, there certainly could have been a reasona-
ble doubt whether Keo shared Sok’s premeditation and intent to kill” based on 
the evidence.49 Keo’s defense at trial was that Sok was the shooter and that he 
did not share Sok’s intent to kill—a defense, Justice Gants reasoned, that 
“would have been immeasurably stronger had defense counsel offered in evi-
dence” the prosecutor’s previous statements because the prosecutor in the Sok 
                                                                                                                           
40 Id. at 69–70. 
41 Id. at 69 (citation omitted); id. at 69–70. 
42 Id. at 70 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 578, 585–86 (Mass. 1999)); id. at 
69–72. 
43 Id. at 70 (citing 910 N.E.2d 869, 885 (Mass. 2009) (Gants, J.) (majority opinion)) (second cita-
tion omitted); id. at 70–71. 
44 Id. at 72 (Gants, J., dissenting). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 72–73 (noting that the prosecutor argued in his closing statement that “Keo ‘is the shoot-
er, that’s what all the evidence shows’”). 
47 Id. The prosecutor said, “It couldn’t have been Bonrad [Sok],’ because the fatal shot was fired 
from within four feet of the victim, and Sok was approximately thirty feet from the victim at the mo-
ment of the shooting.” Id. at 72 (alteration in original). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 72–73. 
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trial made the same argument that defense counsel was asserting in the Keo 
trial.50 
Having explained the significance of defense counsel’s failure to seek to 
introduce the prosecutor’s prior contradictory arguments, Justice Gants dove 
into the law. Although “[a] prosecutor may argue any theory of criminal liabil-
ity supported by the evidence,” and is not limited to theories expounded in 
previous cases,51 “the jury [are] at least entitled to know that the government at 
one time believed, and stated, that its proof established something different 
from what it currently claims.”52 The alternative—permitting a prosecutor, 
“wholly without explanation, to make a fundamental change in its version of 
the facts between trials, and then conceal this change from the final trier of the 
facts”—would undermine “[c]onfidence in the justice system.”53 That is why 
the majority correctly recognized that contradictory arguments may be admis-
sible under certain circumstances, and why Arsenault was no longer sound 
precedent.54 
And while the prosecutor was permitted to argue at the Sok and Keo trials 
that the defendant was the shooter or, in the alternative, was guilty as a joint 
venturer, that does not mean the prosecutor’s assertions were not contradictory 
“as a matter of law,” as the majority concluded.55 The prosecutor “did not 
merely identify the evidence supporting” these two different theories; rather, 
“he made a forceful factual (and inconsistent) assertion that the defendant on 
trial was the shooter.”56 Having done so, the prosecutor could not prevent the 
admission of his contradictory assertions on the basis that he argued alternate 
theories of liability. 
Moreover, the majority’s presumption that the prosecutor changed theo-
ries on whether Sok or Keo was the shooter because the jury in the Sok trial 
convicted Sok as a joint venturer was problematic procedurally and substan-
tively.57 As an initial matter, the prosecutor never attempted to provide an “‘in-
nocent’ explanation” for the change in theories because the defendant did not 
seek to admit the prosecutor’s contradictory assertions.58 Keo, Justice Gants 
argued, should therefore be remanded to the trial court to allow the prosecutor 
the chance to provide an “‘innocent’ explanation.”59 It would then be “the role 
                                                                                                                           
50 Id. at 73. 
51 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Housen, 940 N.E.2d 427, 443 (Mass. 2011)). 
52 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 812 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
53 Id. (quoting Salerno, 937 F.2d at 812). 
54 Id. at 67 n.21, 71–72 (majority opinion). 
55 Id. at 67–69. 
56 Id. at 76 (Gants, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 69–72 (majority opinion). 
58 Id. at 76–77 (Gants, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 77. 
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of the trial judge, not this court, to determine whether [the prosecutor’s expla-
nation] is credible and whether, in the absence of newly discovered evidence, it 
suffices as an innocent explanation for the prosecutor’s 180 degree shift in his 
theory of the case.”60 
Justice Gants also attempted to flesh out what would constitute an “inno-
cent explanation” such that a prosecutor’s inconsistent assertions could be ex-
cluded. For example, if a prosecutor at a subsequent trial “offered ‘additional, 
not conflicting, theories,’” or presented a contradictory theory based on evi-
dence discovered after the first trial, the prosecutor’s statements would not be 
admissible.61 Notably, neither explanation would seem to apply to Keo. As Jus-
tice Gants emphasized throughout his dissent, the prosecutor’s assertions re-
garding the identity of the shooter were directly contradictory, and the Sok and 
Keo trials proceeded on essentially the same evidence.62 Nevertheless, Justice 
Gants did not expressly say that the prosecutor lacked an innocent explanation 
for the change in theories; he was unwilling to foreclose that possibility with-
out the benefit of a full record on the issue.63 
Justice Gants then proceeded to dismantle the majority’s conclusion that, 
even if the prosecutor’s contradictory statements were admissible, the defend-
ant was not prejudiced by the fact that they were not introduced because the 
evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a joint venturer.64 Justice 
Gants agreed the evidence was sufficient to convict Keo as a joint venture, but 
that did not mean there was no prejudice.65 To the contrary, Justice Gants ex-
plained, “the weight of the evidence of Keo’s premeditation and intent to kill 
was far weaker if Sok was the shooter rather than Keo”; not coincidentally, that 
was Keo’s defense at trial.66 Under the circumstances, had the jury learned the 
prosecutor had once advanced the same argument Keo’s trial counsel was mak-
ing, based on the same evidence, the outcome might have been different.67 
Lastly, Justice Gants argued that, regardless of whether defense counsel 
was ineffective for failing to seek to admit the prosecutor’s contradictory 
statements, the court had the authority to remand the case on that issue. In a 
first-degree murder appeal, Justice Gants contended, the court is permitted to 
                                                                                                                           
60 Id. at 77 n.5. 
61 Id. at 75 (quoting United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 716 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
62 Id. at 72–74, 77 n.5, 78–79. 
63 Unfortunately, that full record was never assembled as the majority refused to remand the case 
on this issue; nevertheless, Justice Gants’s guidance on the issue could aid other courts when consid-
ering similar questions in the future. 
64 Keo, 3 N.E.3d at 69–72 (majority opinion). 
65 Id. at 77–78 (Gants, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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order a new trial “for any . . . reason that justice may require.”68 Where the 
prosecutor’s contradictory statements may have been admissible, their admis-
sion “would have substantially bolstered defense counsel’s argument,” and the 
court could not “be certain, or even confident, that the jury would have found 
Keo guilty of murder in the first degree as an aider and abettor if they had a 
reasonable doubt whether Keo was the shooter.”69 Thus, the court was well 
within its authority to remand the case regardless of whether defense counsel 
was ineffective.70 
To hold otherwise, Justice Gants concluded, “is to affirm that the truth 
does not matter in criminal trials, that a prosecutor who lacks an ‘innocent ex-
planation’” may pursue an argument in one trial that “will more easily lead to 
that codefendant’s conviction and, in another trial” advance a directly contra-
dictory argument because it “offers an easier path to securing a conviction.”71 
*    *    * 
In so many ways, Keo was quintessential Gants. It encapsulates who 
Chief Justice Gants was—as a judge, as a reformer, and as a person. 
He prepared. When Justice Gants was nominated to become Chief Jus-
tice, I joked that he was living proof that if you are the most insightful and you 
work the hardest, dreams really could come true. I realized after working with 
him up close for a year how rare that combination is, particularly because tal-
ent and hard work can be at odds with each other—the more natural talent a 
person has, the less hard they may need, or want, to work to be successful. Not 
Chief Justice Gants. He never gave less than his best. His talent and work ethic 
reinforced each other to create his best, and his best was supreme. 
The only reason the court weighed in on the admissibility of the prosecu-
tor’s contradictory statements is because Justice Gants put in the work. He read 
the briefs closely, as he always did, and thought critically about what he read, 
and when he noticed the prosecutor’s contradictory assertions, his alarm went 
off. That meant there was more work for him to do. To be ready for oral argu-
ment he had to devour all the facts and law he could find and ponder whether 
the law needed to change. 
He cared. He cared about every litigant whose case came before him, or 
any court, and he cared about those who would interact with the judicial sys-
tem in the future.72 He wanted to make the legal system work justly for every-
                                                                                                                           
68 Id. at 78 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (2021)). 
69 Id. at 78, 78–79. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 78–79. 
72 Chief Justice Gants’s legendary thoughtfulness was not limited to his opinions—it was how he 
lived his life. I experienced his kindness throughout my year with him, and beyond. When I was to be 
sworn in to the Massachusetts Bar two months into my clerkship, he held a personal ceremony for me 
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one. Process was critical. Any unfairness was unacceptable. If a prosecutor 
wanted to use the same facts to tell different stories at different trials in order 
to increase the government’s chances of “winning” the case and not be held 
accountable for that “180 degree” reversal, that was unfair and needed to be 
remedied.73 
He was proactive. He wanted to root out unfairness. If an issue arose in a 
case on his docket, he called it out and addressed it. If the issue reached be-
yond the walls of his courtroom, as so many did, he sought to wrap his arms 
around it and then solve it in his characteristic way: with speed, force, and 
doggedness. He sought to sweep in as many people as possible to his cause, 
fueled by the knowledge that the legal system could do better and needed to do 
better, and that any less than our best would be to tolerate injustice. 
He embraced tough questions. Although solving the complex problem he 
identified in Keo would not be easy, Justice Gants took it upon himself to try. 
The admissibility of prosecutors’ contradictory statements was a relatively 
novel legal issue in Massachusetts and had only been addressed in a handful of 
jurisdictions around the country. Permitting such statements to be offered into 
evidence invited a host of other thorny questions: How would prosecutors’ 
statements be presented to the jury? How much context would need to be pre-
sented alongside these statements, and would the presentation of too much ev-
idence from an earlier trial risk confusing the jury? If the contradictory argu-
ments were made by the same prosecutor, as was the case in Keo, could the 
prosecutor continue working on the latter case (or the former, for that matter)? 
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Gants believed it was his job to try to answer these 
questions where possible. 
He did not presume to have all the answers. Somehow, amidst all that tal-
ent and hard work, amidst all the good he was doing for so many others, 
amidst all the vexing and critically important problems he was trying to solve, 
he was humble. He listened more than he spoke. He treated others with re-
spect. He asked thoughtful questions and then listened carefully to and consid-
ered the answers. Though he identified the problem in Keo, he did not overstep 
in trying to address it. His solution was to remand the case to the trial court to 
                                                                                                                           
at the courthouse. Though just a few people would be attending and he had only known me a short 
time, Justice Gants spoke as if he was giving the best man toast at my wedding, mixing personal an-
ecdotes with humor and career and life advice. For many, the swearing-in ceremony is simply a for-
mality; he made mine an occasion I will remember and cherish forever. 
73 Notably, Chief Justice Gants’s concern with ensuring the judicial process was as fair as possi-
ble was true with respect to all litigants, not just criminal defendants. To be sure, as a former prosecu-
tor, he believed the government had a heightened responsibility to seek truth and justice. But that 
belief was not limited to prosecutors. He was not shy about reminding lawyers and litigants alike of 
their own ethical obligations when interacting with the judicial system. 
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make the determinations for which it was best suited, which the Appeals Court 
or SJC could then review, if necessary, with the benefit of a complete record. 
And though Keo was not a good vehicle to answer all of the aforemen-
tioned tricky questions the admission of a prosecutor’s prior statements might 
create, he did not let perfect be the enemy of good. Far better to tackle the is-
sue and address the source of unfairness right in front of him than to wait, po-
tentially forever, for an ideal case to present itself. 
He was impactful. Unsurprisingly given all that talent, hard work, and 
concern for others, Chief Justice Gants’s impact was massive. Even in dissent, 
Justice Gants made the legal system work better. Had he not identified the 
prosecutor’s contradictory statements in Keo as problematic, the court would not 
have addressed the issue. The SJC ultimately did not follow Justice Gants’s ap-
proach, but his work in raising the issue and stating his arguments surely result-
ed in the court expressly rejecting Arsenault. The SJC’s decision prevented 
future prosecutors from using it as cover to contradict themselves with impuni-
ty, prevented courts from relying on it as sound precedent, and ensured that 
defendants would not be dissuaded from seeking to introduce such contradic-
tions in the first place. 
And though the court ruled the prosecutor’s contradictory statements were 
inadmissible based on the facts and circumstances of Keo, the court also made 
clear that defendants could introduce a prosecutor’s prior statements under cer-
tain circumstances. In fact, the majority concluded its discussion of the issue 
with an express warning to prosecutors: 
[P]rosecutors, in future cases, should proceed with caution when as-
serting inconsistent arguments in different trials involving the same 
crime, assuming no “innocent explanation,” significant changes, or 
new evidence have come to light. We note that, particularly after 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, there is no need for a prosecutor to em-
phasize principal liability. If a prosecutor does so and the position is 
inconsistent with what he formerly argued at another trial for the 
same crime, he does so possibly at his own peril.74 
Both opinions in Keo—the majority and Justice Gants’s dissent—also served 
as a reminder to prosecutors that they “have a special role in the criminal jus-
tice system ‘in the search for truth in criminal trials.’”75 Because they represent 
“a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all,” a prosecutor’s goal is not simply to “win a case,” 
                                                                                                                           
74 Keo, 3 N.E.3d at 71 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
75 Id. at 64 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999)); id. at 73 n.2 (Gants, J., dis-
senting). 
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but rather to ensure that “justice [is] done.”76 In other words, the “role of [a] 
prosecutor ‘is to assist the jury to discover the truth.’”77 If a prosecutor strayed 
from that obligation to seek truth above all else, Keo showed that the SJC, and 
Justice Gants in particular, was watching and would not be shy about raising 
an issue or holding the Commonwealth accountable. 
Moreover, just as the majority and dissent included warnings to prosecu-
tors, so too did they offer defense counsel an additional tool by which to hold 
government lawyers accountable. Before Keo, members of the defense bar may 
not have tried to find, or sought to introduce, contradictory statements made by 
government attorneys. Keo’s appellate counsel, for example, said at oral argu-
ment she was not familiar with the federal caselaw holding that prosecutors’ con-
tradictory factual assertions were admissible.78 Keo presumably changed that. 
CONCLUSION 
Keo was not among the many landmark decisions Chief Justice Gants au-
thored. Both inside and outside the courtroom, he spearheaded reforms and 
initiatives of far greater import than the specific evidentiary question at issue 
in Keo. 
But Keo offers a window into the special jurist Chief Justice Gants was. 
There, as with virtually anything he touched, Justice Gants focused his unpar-
alleled work ethic, talent, and dedication to improving the legal system, to al-
ways being alert to the possibility of injustice or unfairness in the matters be-
fore him, and to using his time and talent to make the justice system more just. 
That is an inspiring legacy for all of us to emulate. 
                                                                                                                           
76 Id. at 64 (majority opinion) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
77 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Weaver, 511 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1987)). 
78 Oral Argument at 5:49–7:04, Keo, 3 N.E.3d 55 (SJC-10949), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jBtZSG2be5A&t=1232s [https://perma.cc/23CS-YDVA]. 
